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THE “INDO” IN THE “INDO-PACIFIC”
An Indian View
Yogendra Kumar and Probal K. Ghosh
 Like all strategic constructs, the expression Indo-Pacific evokes divergent, even contradictory, responses, depending on the strategic outlook of the responder. 
For the proponents of this construct, the challenge lies in allaying the sensitivities 
of those who consider the term to be an attempt to bolster the U.S.-led security 
architecture that is fraying under the challenge of China’s growing maritime 
power and the perceived unsteadiness of the Trump administration’s commit-
ment to that architecture.
On 1 June 2018, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi delivered what is 
referred to as his “Shangri-La Dialogue speech.” It was aimed at mitigating such 
sensitivities and articulating his vision of a constructive relationship for India 
with all countries of the Indo-Pacific region. He stated that India’s Indo-Pacific 
outlook is not directed against any country but instead stands for “a free, open, 
inclusive region, which embraces us all [including extraregional stakeholders] 
in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity.” Emphasizing India’s approach 
of promoting “a democratic and rules-based international order,” he placed re-
sponsibility on “both existing and rising powers” in the region not to return “to 
the age of great-power rivalries.” He defined the Indo-Pacific region as stretching 
from “the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”—an expansive definition the 
United States does not share.1
While the prime minister’s speech reflects India’s growing strategic engage-
ments across an expanding geographical space, commensurate with its current 
and potential international roles, India’s stated objectives leave open the ques-
tion of how to realize them, given the realities on the ground (so to speak) in 
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A common strategic framework embracing 
both the oceans is at an aspirational stage; the respective strategic perspectives, 
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instrumentalities, and capabilities have yet to crystallize, held hostage as they are 
to geopolitical currents and eddies and the attention spans of national leaders 
who mostly remain in a “firefighting mode,” internally and internationally, owing 
to pervasive uncertainties.
While some security architecture exists in the Pacific Ocean and force equi-
libriums characterize some regions of the Indian Ocean, there is no overall 
security architecture in the region. And in both of those situations, geopolitical 
headwinds are causing the existing arrangements to wobble. Loose groupings of 
countries are emerging either to strengthen or to weaken those arrangements, 
and it is inevitable that the group rivalries involved will spill over from one ocean 
to the other.
Common threats such as climate change, environmental degradation, piracy, 
and human trafficking could be addressed better through an interlocking of 
governance mechanisms throughout the Indo-Pacific continuum. However, the 
challenges to creating and strengthening maritime systems differ between the 
two oceans.
When India considers the Indo-Pacific strategic construct, it is the “Indo” por-
tion that is existential. However, India feels that its strategic stakes in the Pacific 
are growing, causing it to attempt to leverage its regional relationships to influ-
ence the maritime system in the Pacific to suit its interests. But in comparison 
with the United States and, to an extent, China, India faces capacity and capability 
issues that impose prioritization constraints as it attempts to contribute to the 
fleshing out of a true Indo-Pacific strategic continuum.
Attention now focuses on the entire Indian Ocean as a maritime system. This 
is in contrast to the Cold War period, when the U.S.-USSR naval rivalry focused 
attention on the western Indian Ocean choke points, targeted at the force equi-
librium prevailing in the hinterlands from Southwest Asia to the Middle East; 
and to the post–Cold War U.S. approach, which was limited by those hinterland 
requirements even as America’s attention shifted to a China-containment strat-
egy, causing its existing strategic framework for the Indian Ocean to reflect these 
“localized” strategic interests.
THE INDIAN OCEAN: A CHANGING STRATEGIC PICTURE
The changes that the broader strategic picture of the Indian Ocean has been 
undergoing challenge the Indian Ocean littoral countries, as well as others, to 
conceptualize a commensurate holistic Indian Ocean maritime system. While 
the challenges of maintaining the equilibriums on the Middle Eastern and South-
west Asian landmasses remain, the post–Cold War situations there have meta-
morphosed into a much more complex interplay among a bewildering range of 
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actors, even as the old Cold War rivalries are reemerging, albeit under radically 
changed circumstances. New actors have entered the fray even as the old actors 
soldier on. The challenge represented by growing state fragility—even the possi-
bility of state collapse—is perplexing national leaders and strategic analysts alike.
The challenges to the resilience of the existing force equilibrium in the Indian 
Ocean are complicated not just by the factors mentioned above but also by dif-
ferent countries’ growing concerns over issues of freedom of navigation, espe-
cially through oceanic choke points; the deepening naval competition among 
regional as well as extraregional navies; the nature of naval modernization; and 
the broader geopolitical flux. The existing Indian Ocean maritime system came 
into existence, or rather “accreted,” in a different era altogether, resulting from the 
ad hoc nature of the security challenges then faced, and suffers from multifari-
ous limitations for functioning in the current era. The various subregions of the 
Indian Ocean discussed below present a picture of growing maritime system– 
related instabilities.
The Western Indian Ocean
In the western Indian Ocean—as in the southern and eastern Indian Ocean—the 
threats are rooted in inadequate enforcement capabilities. This results in human 
trafficking, drug smuggling, terror financing, and the movement of terrorists and 
criminals both on land and at sea. This region is affected by illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities that deprive those countries in the 
region that have legitimate maritime claims of an important resource for their 
socioeconomic progress.
The region of the northwestern Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa is wit-
nessing a growing competition for opening naval bases, whose establishment 
will enable both regional and extraregional powers to exert greater control over 
both ingress to and egress from the Red Sea.2 The militarization of the Red Sea is 
expected to continue—witness the Houthi attacks on the Saudi, U.S., and United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) navies, as well as commercial vessels traveling between the 
Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; on 1 June 2018, a spokesman for the Houthis stated 
that Abu Dhabi was now within range of their missiles.3
This trend raises wider concerns about securing navigation routes through the 
Bab el Mandeb into the Red Sea and through the Suez Canal into the Mediter-
ranean Sea. The problem is compounded by the intensifying conflict in Yemen, 
which has drawn in not only regional but extraregional powers. These naval 
port-building activities signify an intensifying contest among the protagonists to 
dominate this choke point during a diverse array of future precipitous contingen-
cies. These unfolding dynamics exacerbate the trend toward the fraying of the 
maritime system in this strategic subregion.
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Political instability in this region also is leading to the gradual reemergence 
of piracy, the acceleration of illegal migration along the East African seaboard, 
and the presence of and “rooting in” of al-Qaeda and the remnants of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria.
The Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf region is witnessing deepening tensions as an overflow from 
the ongoing conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq and the worsening of 
existing regional rivalries, primarily between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The new 
force alignment developing in this area involves growing activity by extraregional 
powers, including incipient revival of the Cold War tensions between Russia and 
the United States. The added element is the tension among the Gulf Arab states, 
contributions to which include deepening fissures between Qatar and the other 
Gulf states as well as the involvement of countries such as Turkey and Iran in 
intra-Gulf Arab rivalries. This is leading to exacerbated tensions in the region be-
tween the Iranian and U.S. navies, as evidenced by the frequent naval encounters 
between them. This poses a grave concern for freedom of navigation through the 
Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for global trade.
Another dimension of the growing challenge is the rapid modernization of the 
Pakistan Navy, including its decision to acquire eight Yuan-class Type 041 diesel-
electric submarines from China. This development has the potential to upset the 
regional balance of power, leading to further power disequilibriums. The danger 
of “loose nukes at sea” also increases with the Pakistan Navy’s decision to deploy 
nuclear weapons on its naval platforms. Al-Qaeda’s September 2014 attempt to 
capture PNS Zulfikar at the Karachi naval base provides forewarning of the vul-
nerability of deployed nukes to terrorists.4
U.S. Naval War College analysts Peter Dombrowski and Andrew C. Winner 
have opined that China’s future capabilities and actions in the Indian Ocean rep-
resent the most obvious potential source of U.S. policy change. This is especially 
so given China’s closer naval alliance with Pakistan.5
Indian Ocean Island Countries
The ramifications of the growing challenges to the existing equilibrium in the 
wider Indian Ocean are being felt by Indian Ocean island countries as well. This 
is partly the result of their lack of capacity to exploit their respective maritime 
resources and to cope with the threats of piracy and the illegal trafficking of drugs 
and migrants. Many of the state systems already are vulnerable owing to their 
economic fragility (they mostly have single-factor economic systems), to which 
climate change adds a growing threat. Some of this state fragility manifests itself 
in deepening internal power struggles, which external powers then exploit, re-
sulting in the fragmentation and polarization of the island communities, which 
enhance their vulnerability to jihadi extremism.
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As elsewhere, the expanding Chinese footprint is visible in the growing 
frequency of Chinese naval patrols, including by submarines, as well as the 
expanding scope of China’s Maritime Silk Route (MSR) projects. The growing 
Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean has balance-of-power ramifications 
that may destabilize the maritime system, given the inadequacies of the existing 
governance mechanisms. Moreover, many of the MSR projects are being car-
ried out without regard to their true economic viability, leading the weak island 
economies into an inextricable debt trap. The resulting economic, then political, 
instability has the potential to destabilize the existing maritime system in this 
subregion.
The Eastern Indian Ocean
Problems related to human trafficking and drug trafficking are major concerns in 
the eastern Indian Ocean, as are instances of piracy. Jihadist militancy is on the 
rise, as are other forms of ethnic insurgency. The fragility of the littoral states on 
or in the Bay of Bengal contributes to these growing phenomena, and the region 
is prone to extreme weather events that can aggravate that state fragility. The 
eastern Indian Ocean also can expect certain potential disequilibriums, similar 
to those in other Indian Ocean subregions but for dissimilar reasons.
The force structure in the Bay of Bengal is changing, gradually. The littoral 
naval capabilities are growing, including in the development of submarine forces. 
The littoral countries are conscious of their maritime zones and are building 
the capability to look after them. In late 2016, the Bangladesh Navy acquired 
two Chinese Ming-class Type 035B diesel-electric submarines. In April 2017, 
Thailand, declaring its intention to better police its Bay of Bengal coastline, 
made the decision to acquire three Chinese Yuan-class S26T submarines. (So 
far a firm contract has been placed for only one of these, for delivery by 2023.)6 
The Myanmar government also has declared its intention to acquire a submarine 
capability.7
The Indian Navy has the strongest presence here, with system-defense and 
policing capabilities, and is developing additional infrastructure in the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands to support these functions. It also carries out coordinated 
patrols with Myanmar, Indonesia, and Thailand in pursuit of effective surveil-
lance. Its deployment of a nuclear-missile-equipped submarine changes the stra-
tegic picture in this subregion, in that it draws the attention not only of China but 
of other major powers to the implications for their deterrence postures.
China’s naval footprint is limited but its commercial shipping activities are 
growing, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative projects. Assets include not only 
ports but gas and oil pipelines and road and railway infrastructure. The open-
ing of the Myanmar economy has meant a greater focus on the development of 
special economic zones around important ports in that country. Similar plans 
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are afoot with respect to Thailand and Malaysia, especially the latter, which has 
very ambitious plans for developing its port capacity and seaboard infrastructure.
The Strait of Malacca is an important choke point that necessitates serious 
international attention. Other choke points include the Sunda, Lombok, and 
Ombai Straits. As these choke points straddle the “Indo” and the “Pacific,” their 
strategic salience has increased in recent times.
MARITIME SYSTEM INSTABILITY CHALLENGES
Looming Disequilibriums
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Strategic Survey 2016 
begins by stating that “the underpinnings of geopolitics have splintered so 
much in the past year that the foundations of global order appear alarmingly 
weak. . . . Multiple strategic earthquakes have created a situation in which world 
leaders are in a constant state of crisis control.”8
The different challenges to the existing power equilibrium in the Indian Ocean 
have different sources, and the evolving trends need to be evaluated across the 
entire region. Similarly, ongoing subregional developments need to be evaluated 
for their region-wide ramifications.
Political fragility and the resultant economic disarray invite external powers to 
manipulate domestic political processes for their own agendas; they also intensify 
multiple regional power struggles. State fragility at key oceanic locations, as well 
as in the Middle Eastern heartland, compounds in at least three ways the threats 
to maritime system stability posed by climate change, extreme weather events, 
and the structural embedding of nonstate actors—be they extremists, pirates, 
or common criminals—within collapsing political structures. First, the growing 
phenomenon of state collapse or regional political collapse renders unfruit-
ful—even Sisyphean—any attempt to create a power structure across the region. 
Second, state or regional collapse would defeat any attempts by the international 
community to create a normative framework for the peaceful and sustainable 
use of the Indian Ocean. And third, such collapse also would militate against the 
overall vision of economic integration of the littoral economies to enable them 
to play their due role in the economic and technological globalization processes 
that are taking place in the rest of the Asian region.
Other Traditional and Nontraditional Challenges
Although the existing balance of power is tilted heavily in favor of the United 
States, the existing Indian Ocean maritime system faces serious challenges; its 
inadequacies to respond effectively to changing circumstances are numerous. 
The system was “designed” for different requirements, and several geopolitical 
factors, including changes in the power relations among the major littoral and 
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nonlittoral powers, have led to strategic distrust among them. Regional uncer-
tainty regarding whether China’s entry into the Indian Ocean would be “disrup-
tive” is compounded further by the emerging geostrategic rivalry in the Middle 
East and the Persian Gulf region, in addition to the rivalries already existing 
there.
The absence of any region-wide capability to protect fish stocks from IUU 
fishing, affecting a large part of the Indian Ocean littoral, means that several 
littoral countries have no stake in the creation of a more comprehensive, region-
wide maritime system. Various terrorist entities have tried to acquire—some 
successfully—a maritime capability, and they continue to seek to acquire increas-
ingly lethal capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction. The possibilities 
for destabilization arising from climate change are growing, both at sea and in 
coastal regions, affecting existing coping mechanisms for natural disasters and 
climate-mitigation efforts, and ultimately state stability.
MARITIME SYSTEM DEFENSE ISSUES AND  
INTEROPERABILITY CAPABILITIES
Force-Projection Infrastructure
In terms of existing military infrastructure, the most significant presence in the 
region is that of an extraregional power, the United States. Its bases in Diego Gar-
cia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Djibouti provide the skeleton for the power structure in 
the Indian Ocean, fleshed out with its air, space, and other military assets. It has 
formidable undersea capabilities in the eastern Indian Ocean, ship-basing rights 
at Singapore, and troop-rotation facilities at Darwin, Australia.
Regarding other powers, both regional and extraregional, Australia has fa-
cilities at the Cocos Islands and Christmas Island, covering the Sunda Strait; 
this array of forces represents a significant posture for maintaining the existing 
power equilibrium in both the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. France has 
naval and military capabilities in Réunion, Djibouti, and Abu Dhabi. The United 
Kingdom (U.K.), which “leased” the Diego Garcia base to the United States in 
1966, also has made a comeback after a gap of four decades by opening a naval 
base in Bahrain.9
Among regional navies, the Indian Navy is the strongest, with considerable 
infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and a developing one in the 
Lakshadweep Island chain. The Iranian navy has considerable presence in the 
Persian Gulf region, where its confrontations with the U.S. Navy reflect the tense 
relationship between the two countries.
The Chinese navy’s “logistics base” in Djibouti, ostensibly established to sup-
port antipiracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa, also serves as a 
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means of power projection in the region. This certainly was evident in November 
2017, when visiting Chinese president Xi Jinping, dressed in full military uni-
form, addressed the Chinese contingent there, exhorting its members to promote 
“international and regional peace and stability.”10
Information-Sharing Infrastructure
The existing infrastructure for information sharing and for maintaining mari-
time domain awareness (MDA) is patchy and oriented toward supporting the 
current force-projection missions. It remains quite inadequate for fulfilling the 
emerging requirements for maritime system defense, as it largely is geared toward 
coastal security. It currently is not able adequately to support action across the 
entire Indian Ocean region (IOR) to combat drug trafficking and other forms of 
transnational crime, such as IUU fishing.
Beyond the usual ways of gaining maritime domain awareness (e.g., regular 
joint patrolling with naval contingents of different countries, coverage by existing 
shore-based radar installations, and use of space assets), the Indian Navy, with 
the agreement of the host governments, has installed additional radar equipment 
in Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagascar. There also are maritime- 
information-sharing centers in the western Indian Ocean in Sanaa, Yemen; 
Mombasa, Kenya; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with communication links 
to various countries in the region for mounting search-and-rescue (SAR) 
operations. The Indian Information Management and Analysis Centre, near Delhi, 
aggregates information to provide maritime domain awareness over almost the 
entire Indian Ocean. The Singapore-based Information Sharing Centre also pro-
vides significant domain awareness in the Indian Ocean. In certain information 
segments, capabilities are available as well within the Indian Ocean Commission; 
its members are Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion, and Seychelles.
Ongoing efforts envisage the interlinking of various of these capabilities to 
provide a comprehensive domain picture for the Indian Ocean. However, the 
complexity of these efforts should not be underestimated.
Maritime System Defense Mechanisms, Established and Incipient
A broad overview of current maritime system defense mechanism efforts serves 
to underline their ad hoc character. The maintenance of good order at sea (to 
use the universally accepted naval expression) includes a role for great powers as 
well as multilateral collaborative activities, both well organized and incipient. The 
roles of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard are touched on elsewhere in this article.
The uniqueness of the Indian Ocean in this respect is the considerable experi-
ence in interoperability shared among regional and extraregional navies, includ-
ing in carrying out specific missions. This may build sufficient confidence to 
diversify interoperability missions in the direction of system-defense functions. 
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Yet the creation of a holistic, resilient maritime system adequate to the full spec-
trum of challenges is a far more complex challenge.
Established Structures. The U.S. naval command system for the Indian Ocean 
presents a bit of a jigsaw puzzle. It consists of different naval commands for dif-
ferent subregions, without much intercommand coordination. The U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command (previously the Pacific Command [PACOM]) covers the area 
east of the imaginary maritime dividing line between India and Pakistan. West of 
that line the Central Command (CENTCOM) coverage extends over the remain-
ing part of the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the area close to the African 
seaboard, which the Africa Command covers. Still within the Indian Ocean, the 
Gulf of Aqaba (including Elat) is covered by the European Command, because 
Israel lies within its area of responsibility. The U.S. State Department divides 
the region into geographical bureaus whose boundaries do not correspond with 
those of the Department of Defense.11 Owing to this segmented combination of 
responsibilities for various government agencies, including the military’s theater 
commands, the United States does not have a single “mind” of its own as far as the 
defense of the entire Indian Ocean maritime system is concerned.
With regard to antipiracy missions, especially in the Horn of Africa region, 
the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction system (known as SHADE) provides a 
mechanism for sharing information among the various interested countries, in-
cluding with nongovernmental stakeholders. Discussions cover coordination of 
escorts for merchant shipping passing through the internationally recommended 
transit corridor, as well as aerial coverage of high-risk areas. These meetings take 
place at CENTCOM headquarters in Bahrain.
The European Union (EU) naval complement (EUNAVFOR) plans to conduct 
Operation ATALANTA through December 2020. Its purpose is to protect vessels 
of the World Food Programme and other shipping, deter and disrupt piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, and 
support other EU missions and international obligations to strengthen maritime 
security and capacity in the region. It covers the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including the waters around Sey-
chelles, Mauritius, and Comoros. EUNAVFOR’s current deployments involve 
one Italian and one Spanish frigate and a Spanish P-3C Orion.12 The Maritime 
Security Centre–Horn of Africa, headquartered in Northwood, United Kingdom, 
provides twenty-four-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the 
Gulf of Aden, including an interactive capability to provide current information 
to shippers and escorts. Non-EU members such as Ukraine, New Zealand, and 
South Korea also have joined EUNAVFOR.
The U.S. Navy operates three multinational combined task forces (CTFs) in 
the region. CTF 150 was set up in 2001 to fight the “global war on terrorism,” 
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including in the Horn of Africa area; CTF 151 was set up in 2009 to confront 
piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden; and CTF 152 was set up in 
2004 to provide maritime security in the Persian Gulf. These assignments mean 
that these task forces also operate in the northern and northwestern Indian 
Ocean. Headquartered at the U.S. base in Bahrain, the relevant command is the 
U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet; a Royal Navy (U.K.) commodore assists. These different 
task forces incorporate units from NATO member states, non-NATO U.S. allies, 
and others.
Incipient Structures. Among the multilateral organizations that are still in the 
more formative stages are the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the 
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).
IORA is beginning to engage its member countries to develop an extensive 
maritime-safety and -security cooperative enterprise with legal and regulatory 
underpinnings. Owing to the numerous dimensions involved in developing 
such a capability for the organization, the process is still in its infancy, and thus 
the organization’s and members’ capabilities mostly remain woefully limited.13 
However, this organization could be the main agency for providing many of 
the functions needed to sustain a transformed maritime system for the Indian 
Ocean.
The members of IONS are the heads of navies and coast guards of a large 
number of the littoral countries. While it is an important organization with con-
siderable potential for developing confidence-building measures (CBMs) and 
enhancing strategic trust among its members and observers, given those parties’ 
diversity (and, in some cases, their adversarial relationships) IONS has yet to 
develop the range of interoperability templates required to overcome the various 
threats and challenges found in the regional maritime arena.14
PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION
India’s SAGAR Framework in the Indo-Pacific Context
Indian prime minister Narendra Modi articulated his vision for the IOR in a 
major speech at Port Louis, Mauritius, on 12 March 2015. In it he coined the acro-
nym SAGAR, standing for the motto “Security and growth for all in the region”; 
as a word, the expression means “sea” in Hindi.15
The concept consists of five elements.
• India has national responsibility to safeguard its mainland and islands. As-
sociated objectives include contributing to a safe, secure, and stable region 
and fulfilling a commitment to help others during natural disasters and SAR 
operations.
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• India seeks to deepen economic and security cooperation within the re- 
gion, including strengthening maritime-security capacities and maritime 
economies.
• India aims to achieve collective cooperation for peace and security, better  
preparedness for emergencies through multilateral mechanisms such as 
IONS, and bilateral maritime-security cooperation.
• India intends to contribute to greater regional integration on the basis of sus-
tainable development, including for combating climate change, and building 
the “blue economy,” using IORA as an instrument for this purpose.
• The primary responsibility for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indian 
Ocean rests with the littoral states themselves. India seeks a climate of trust 
and transparency, respect for international maritime rules and norms by all 
countries while remaining sensitive to each other’s interests, peaceful resolu-
tion of maritime issues, and increased maritime cooperation. 
While Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La vision for the Indo-Pacific is philosoph-
ically consistent with the general concept of a free, open, and inclusive maritime 
order, it is the SAGAR vision that represents an actionable agenda to achieve a 
viable Indian Ocean maritime system.16
The Indian Navy’s 2015 articulation of India’s maritime-security strategy 
envisages an expanded role for the service as a “net security provider” in the 
country’s maritime neighborhood. It identifies primary areas of maritime inter-
est, which include India’s coastal maritime zones, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of 
Bengal, the Andaman Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, 
the Red Sea, the southwest Indian Ocean, the east coast of Africa, and the various 
IOR choke points and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Secondary areas of 
interest are the southeastern Indian Ocean, the South and East China Seas, the 
western Pacific Ocean, the southern Indian Ocean region (including Antarctica), 
the Mediterranean Sea, and the west coast of Africa. Other areas may become of 
interest, depending on national considerations.17
The increasing tactical complexity of the MALABAR series of exercises, which 
involve India, the United States, and Japan, illustrates a shared perspective among 
those countries. The U.S. government has underlined this perspective further by 
renaming its Pacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command, even as the theater 
command’s area of responsibility remains unchanged; the rechristening denotes 
a greater salience of the Indian Ocean (and thus of India) in this perspective. 
Although enhanced interoperability can be useful for any type of joint mission, 
conduct of the MALABAR series, with exercise locations alternating between the 
Bay of Bengal and the western Pacific, does signify that all three countries have 
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stakes in the strategic equilibriums prevailing in the two subregions. This denotes 
that there is a certain “buy-in” by India of the U.S. perspective on the Indo- 
Pacific, as represented in the latter’s own geographical definition. Even so, all 
three countries maintain their own respective networks of relationships in South-
east and East Asia, particularly with China.
India also has shed an earlier inhibition in that it has agreed to deploy a naval 
liaison officer to the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, in Bahrain. The inten-
tion is to facilitate enhanced situational awareness.18
Even given that Indian and U.S. perspectives share considerable strategic 
convergence toward maintaining the current strategic equilibrium, developing 
a composite perspective on the Indian Ocean would be necessary for a closer 
sharing of these perspectives. Achieving this would require creation of an Ameri-
can “home” for the policy somewhere within the U.S. government: a policy- 
coordination unit that would be charged with creating and maintaining an of-
ficial, composite, strategic “picture.” This policy-coordination function would 
need to be mirrored at the think-tank level on both sides.19
Within the existing relationship, strong Indo-U.S. cooperation against terror-
ism is an ongoing process. India would expect and welcome the United States 
and the larger international community to weigh in—as strongly as possible—to 
assist in neutralizing that cross-border terrorism that has come to be identified 
with Pakistan.
Evolving U.S. Thinking
American thinking on the Indian Ocean continues to evolve past the Cold War 
era. The United States strives to respond, via both hard-power and diplomatic 
means, to ongoing regional developments. As regional stability increasingly 
becomes anchored in the Indian Ocean as a whole, the segmented nature of the 
U.S. approach to force engagement is exposed as inadequate. The overall U.S. 
force drawdown, as currently envisaged—unconnected as it seems to be to any 
holistic vision or grand strategy—only can aggravate the challenges to American 
interests and to those of others in the region. Even in terms of the country’s own 
national security perspective alone, there is no strong unanimity within the U.S. 
strategic community that the existing maritime system can be calibrated to meet 
these challenges effectively.
America’s existing national security perspective consists of bolstering the 
largely favorable political order in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and 
managing the Chinese naval footprint. At the instance of the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, an interagency review of the IOR was undertaken in early 2012; 
several high-profile American delegations visited India, Australia, and other re-
gional players. However, beyond the Obama administration’s announcement of 
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a “rebalancing” toward Asia in general, no new initiatives for the Indian Ocean 
were reported. The expectation has been that the U.S. approach would be one of 
“muddling through.”20
The unclassified summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), which 
the Secretary of Defense released on 19 January 2018, states as follows: “A free 
and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all. We will 
strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked 
security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and 
ensuring free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we 
will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the 
free and open international system.”21 Under the same broad theme of regional 
defense challenges, the strategy states its objective of fostering a stable and secure 
Middle East that denies safe havens to terrorists, is not dominated by any power 
hostile to the United States, and contributes to “stable global energy markets and 
secure trade routes.” It also aims to consolidate gains in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, 
and elsewhere and “to support the lasting defeat of terrorists as we sever their 
sources of strength and counterbalance Iran.”22
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which President Trump released 
in December 2017, distinguishes the “Indo-Pacific” from the “Middle East” and 
“South and Central Asia.” It describes the Indo-Pacific as stretching from the 
west coast of India to the western shores of the United States—precisely the area 
of responsibility of PACOM (now Indo-Pacific Command). The NSS is quite 
China-centric in its threat assessment, dwelling little on the situation in the 
IOR and its governance mechanisms. While the NSS reaffirms the U.S. military 
commitment to the security and stability of the Middle East, it states that “[f]or 
years, the interconnected problems of Iranian expansion, state collapse, jihadist 
ideology, socio-economic stagnation, and regional rivalries [have] convulsed the 
Middle East.” In its discussion of South and Central Asia, the NSS refers to the 
Indian Ocean only once, stating, “We will deepen our strategic partnership with 
India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout 
the broader region.”23
Manifestly, the NSS anticipates the NDS in terms of the operating U.S. per-
spective on the Indian Ocean maritime system. Specific factors impacting on 
that system’s resilience—such as balance-of-power considerations, state fragility, 
terrorism, and the safety of navigation routes—are highlighted, but largely within 
the context of different regions’ strategic milieus. These documents pay no at-
tention to the larger issue of the governance of the Indian Ocean as a maritime 
system. This signals a belief that the factors affecting the unified system’s resil-
ience can be addressed effectively by focusing on specific negative phenomena 
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in different regions and through the normal diplomatic engagements of a su-
perpower. In other words, the U.S. approach to the Indian Ocean, as currently 
constituted, lacks the attributes of a grand strategy.
Given the segmented nature of the American approach to IOR governance, 
that approach remains inherently reactive. By its nature it will be unlikely to 
shape proactively a new maritime system capable of coping with the threats that 
are emerging, including of the nontraditional variety, in the near-to-medium 
term. There is an ominous aspect to this approach, given the fast-paced develop-
ments in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, with their grave implications for 
the maritime system as a whole.
The Chinese Approach
The Chinese government does not have an officially articulated policy on the 
Indian Ocean. However, its 2015 white paper on military strategy represents a 
doctrinal shift from “offshore waters defense” to a combination of that objec-
tive with “open seas protection,” as well as the abandonment of the “traditional 
mentality that land outweighs sea,” so that “great importance has to be attached 
to managing the seas and oceans, and protecting maritime rights and interests.”24 
According to Ryan Martinson, in the Chinese text of the white paper, the relevant 
concept translates more accurately as “strategic management.”25
China clearly has come of age, in both its conception and its program (the 
latter covering 2016–20) to emerge as a maritime power in all dimensions. As its 
overseas assets multiply, expanding beyond the so-called first island chain, China 
also is developing its capacity to protect those islands—and indeed to fly its flag 
in any waters of interest to it.
An important aspect of this endeavor is to invest significantly—in a politi-
cal sense—in IOR littoral and island countries, especially in the form of mari-
time infrastructure projects carried out under its MSR program. Some of these 
projects, when executed in financially weak countries, have resulted in Chinese 
acquisition of equity participation, yielding greater control over their manage-
ment. Because of these projects’ strategic locations, there are apprehensions about 
them being used for military purposes, although China has not stated explicitly 
any intention to have naval bases in the Indian Ocean. However, given China’s 
tendency toward “changing the facts on the ground” in the South China Sea, such 
apprehensions are not groundless.
Djibouti offers an example worth considering. A July 2017 CNA study on Dji-
bouti offers citations from the Chinese ministry of defense website in 2010 to the 
effect that reports of Chinese overseas bases are groundless, then presents 2015 
quotations from a Chinese foreign office spokesperson that “the building of lo-
gistical facilities in Djibouti . . . will better guarantee Chinese troops to carry out 
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international peacekeeping operations, escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Somali waters, humanitarian relief, and other tasks.”26 As mentioned earlier, 
in November 2017 the Chinese president addressed the Chinese troops in Dji-
bouti, asking them to promote “international and regional peace and stability.”27 
In February 2018, a People’s Liberation Army Navy task force (consisting of at 
least one modern destroyer, a frigate, an amphibious assault ship, and a support 
tanker) then in the eastern Indian Ocean briefly entered the port. At least one 
observer believed that this port visit influenced the course of a political crisis 
then ongoing in the Maldives.28
The expanding Chinese activities, diplomatic as well as naval, cannot yet be 
considered to be shaping the Indian Ocean maritime system, but by their nature 
they certainly can be interpreted as a reflection of the country’s desire to shape 
it in the future. They also signify that the Chinese entry into the Indian Ocean 
can be expected to be disruptive of the existing maritime system—unless serious 
efforts are made to shape the maritime system to meet the growing challenges.
The Japanese Approach
The Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has espoused a 
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”; the strategy was conceptualized in Abe’s 
speech in 2007 to India’s Parliament. It envisages improved connectivity between 
Asia and Africa and the promotion of stability in and prosperity for the region 
as a whole; the Japanese conception defines the region geographically more 
broadly than does the United States. The strategy seeks to realize its goals through 
strengthened strategic collaboration with India as well as with the United States 
and Australia.
The strategy lays stress on democracy, the rule of law, and market economics 
in Southeast and East Asia, and on “nation-building support in the area of devel-
opment as well as politics and governance” in Africa. In the maritime domain, the 
emphasis is on the “rule of law and freedom of navigation,” especially compliance 
with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Another important 
aspect is ensuring peace and stability, including cooperation in capacity building 
for maritime law enforcement and MDA.29
The strategy manifested itself in November 2017 in the convening of the 
Quadrilateral Dialogue among the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. 
Another manifestation was the scaled-up Exercise MALABAR that took place in 
July 2017 in the Bay of Bengal with participation by India, the United States, and 
Japan, which served to enhance naval interoperability within the U.S.-defined 
Indo-Pacific construct. According to Japanese media reports, enhancement of 
maritime-security capabilities is being achieved through greater Japanese in-
volvement with countries such as Djibouti (where the Japan Coast Guard has 
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provided training and has gifted patrol boats) and Sri Lanka (similarly, antipiracy 
drills and patrol boats).30
Japan’s strategy has the support of several countries, including India and the 
United States. Not yet a comprehensive approach toward shaping the Indian 
Ocean maritime order, the strategy still is unfolding, and so far lacks the visibility 
of the Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean.
Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum
Indonesian president Joko Widodo announced in 2014 his vision of Indonesia’s 
role as the “Global Maritime Fulcrum” (GMF). The GMF concept comprises 
five core pillars: maritime culture, maritime infrastructure and connectivity, 
protection of maritime resources, maritime diplomacy, and maritime defense; 
two auxiliary pillars are maritime governance and the maritime environment.31
While this vision informs Indonesian initiatives in various international 
forums (especially the convening of the first-ever IORA summit in Jakarta in 
March 2017), its emphasis is more on economic aspects and less on hard-core 
military capabilities. Even as Indonesia continues to envisage cooperation with 
China on MSR projects, it concluded an agreement with India to develop port 
and related infrastructure projects in and around the Indonesian port of Sabang, 
on the northern tip of Sumatra.32
Since 2014, Indonesia has been conducting the KOMODO biennial multilateral 
naval exercise; the latest iteration occurred in May 2018 at Lombok Island and in 
nearby waters, with a focus on humanitarian and disaster-response operations. 
These exercises are well attended, including by the navies of India, China, and 
the United States.
The Iranian Approach
At the 2018 Munich Security Conference, the Iranian foreign minister advanced 
a proposal for a Persian Gulf version of the Helsinki process that would be based 
on the UN Charter and on “ticket principles” and “CBM baskets,” to which all 
Gulf countries purportedly should be able to subscribe. The process eventually 
was to lead to a regional nonaggression pact; it also envisaged a regional dialogue 
forum involving both intergovernmental and nongovernmental interactions.33
As chairman for the 2018 IONS, the commander of the Iranian navy used his 
inaugural speech before the symposium to stress that it should be the countries of 
a particular region that ensure the security of that region; he warned that a naval 
presence by outsiders could impose foreign security arrangements on the region. 
He also urged IONS to set up a combat group, and to formulate a “common tacti-
cal language for coordinated naval measures,” to contribute to stability.34 
The Iranian naval deterrence strategy of area denial is anchored on blocking 
the Strait of Hormuz by sea, air, and land should hostilities break out. Both the 
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Iranian navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) have 
parts to play under this strategy, but whereas the IRGCN concentrates its ac-
tivities inside the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to conduct asymmetrical 
operations, the Iranian navy—the more professional, conventional, blue-water 
force—covers the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, and the Red Sea. Occasionally the navy ventures even beyond that; it has 
participated actively in antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa.
Iranian naval capabilities are to be deployed against both certain Gulf states, 
such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the United States, which has a significant 
presence in both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Incidents of military 
confrontation between Iranian naval forces and those of the United States are 
not infrequent in the Persian Gulf region. Donald Trump, during his 2016 presi-
dential election campaign, even threatened that Iranian vessels harassing the U.S. 
Navy would be “shot out of the water.”35 Amid rising military tension in the re-
gion, one ramification of the hardening U.S. position vis-à-vis Iran is that current 
access to Afghanistan—vital for both Indian and American interests—through 
the Iranian port of Chabahar, only recently opened to India, appears to be in 
jeopardy owing to the reluctance, in a volatile environment, of Indian firms and 
others to work there lest they attract secondary U.S. sanctions.
THE WAY AHEAD
A Broader Approach
Strengthened pan-IOR governance mechanisms and bilateral maritime diplo-
macy can help develop normative templates and enforcement capabilities. The 
stakes that littoral countries, especially small island countries, have in a holistic 
maritime system can be nurtured through combating climate change and other 
nontraditional, system-destabilizing challenges. A holistic maritime system, of 
the type that Prime Minister Modi envisaged, would counter, to a considerable 
extent, the growing—and geographically expanding—gyre of state collapse and 
regional instability, with its attendant flourishing of jihadist groups.
The jihadist challenge, which has critical ramifications for India because of 
the movement’s extensive (especially diasporal) links, is a particularly complex 
phenomenon in the Gulf region, as well as the Horn of Africa. India’s strategic 
interests do not converge foursquare with those of the United States in this sub-
region, which is witnessing the hostility between the United States and Iran and 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the added complication of a deepening rift 
between Qatar and the rest of the countries of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf (known as the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]). Yet the 
United States, given its preeminence in the region, nonetheless can help shape a 
new maritime system, some elements of which are discussed below.
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Ground Rules for Freedom of Navigation and Use of Littoral Harbors by Extra-
regional Navies. There is an urgent need to devise ground rules for freedom of 
navigation and the use of littoral harbors by extraregional navies. Presently, these 
matters are left to the devices of the individual country or countries concerned—
and it is amply evident that the outcome so far has been to worsen the situation.
Although UNCLOS enjoins countries to respect freedom of navigation, 
certain countries base their grand strategies on closing choke points. A prime 
example is Iran with regard to the Strait of Hormuz; however, the same observa-
tion applies to the United States with regard to the Malacca Strait.36 Extralittoral 
navies are engaged in setting up bases in the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, 
implicitly threatening closure of SLOCs in the Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal.
Actions such as these aggravate regional tensions, potentially leading to the 
unraveling of the entire Indian Ocean maritime system. While naval operations 
in pursuit of the security interests of individual countries are sovereign activities, 
ground rules for both freedom of navigation and the use of littoral harbors can 
be developed without constraining states’ security operations.
Raising Strategic Trust Levels among the Major Navies. Yet another important 
effort should be aimed at raising strategic trust levels among the major navies. 
The goal should be to stabilize their force levels so that the balance-of-power 
equilibrium is not disturbed.
Front-loading cooperative activities in various multilateral governance forums 
in the IOR and recognizing the legitimacy of relevant countries’ stakes in the IOR 
maritime system and its stability could build up such strategic trust. This could 
lead to a slowing, or even a reversal, of current trends of naval buildup.
Upholding the SAGAR National Security Priorities. In both the efforts men-
tioned immediately above, the SAGAR conceptual framework provides a strong 
basis on which to conduct national and multilateral diplomacy. India’s leadership 
believes that placing responsibility for the peace, stability, and prosperity of the 
Indian Ocean on the littoral states themselves will ensure that the country’s mari-
time security and larger maritime interests are well safeguarded. This approach 
is consistent with the nation’s sovereign right of national defense, which covers 
not only the mainland and the islands but also its efforts to “ensure a safe, secure, 
and stable Indian Ocean region that delivers . . . all to the shores of prosperity.”37 
The framework also lays out a basis for external navies to secure their legitimate 
national interests.
India’s policy toward the Gulf region and the Horn of Africa, at both the 
bilateral and the multilateral levels, seeks to persuade all the adversarial coun-
tries that they have stakes in regional stability, which is the key to economic 
progress and societal cohesion. All states should bear in mind that mass internal 
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or transborder migrations are in the interest of nobody—not countries in the 
region; not Europe; not other stakeholder countries, such as China, Japan, and 
Russia; and not countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, or the Far East. A 
balance-of-power equation operates only when there are nation-states at both 
ends of the relationship; collapse of either triggers a very different kind of dy-
namic, as illustrated in the Afghanistan and Iraq experiences. As the recent U.S. 
moves in the Gulf region have shown, in the wake of the GCC rift over Qatar, 
America wants to ensure that the security architecture it has set up in that littoral 
region remains strong. Any instability there would make it impossible for the 
United States to sustain this security architecture. Instability in the Gulf region 
would imperil not only India’s energy supplies but also the lives and well-being 
of the millions of expatriate Indians who live there.
Bilateral capacity building through cultivation of relationships with countries 
in the region and the strengthening of pan-IOR governance mechanisms for 
developing the ground rules discussed above would mitigate to some extent the 
destabilizing effects of the hard-power pursuits of national interests revealed in 
the violent contestations taking place within the region. In this effort, India will 
find other influential countries willing to act in tandem with it, and it can lever-
age its own friendly relations with nearly all countries in the region. The United 
States would need to calibrate its regional approach according to its own sen-
sitivity toward the possibility that increased China-Pakistan naval cooperation 
would upset the regional balance of power, as well as the danger represented by 
the “loose nukes at sea” issue.38
Indian Ocean Maritime System Capacity Issues
IORA’s Charter Responsibilities. Because of its essentially pan-IOR character, 
IORA is uniquely suited to help shape a holistic maritime system for the Indian 
Ocean. Apart from economic and cultural cooperation, the organization aims 
to tackle maritime-security, disaster-response, and blue-economy challenges. Its 
action plan for 2017–21 spells out near-, medium-, and long-term initiatives.39 
While this has created a skeletal framework of the desired action, a stronger po-
litical will to drive the process is necessary, just as the creation of sufficient stakes 
for outside powers is necessary to further the organization’s institutional growth.
The IORA Summit Declaration of 7 March 2017, called the Jakarta Concord, 
describes the scope of the field of maritime safety and security as covering ac-
cidents and incidents at sea; the safety of vessels and the marine environment; 
transboundary challenges such as piracy and armed robbery at sea; terrorism; 
trafficking in persons and the smuggling of people, illicit drugs, and wildlife; 
crimes in the fisheries sector and environmental crimes; and freedom of navi-
gation and overflight, in accordance with international law and UNCLOS. The 
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action plan includes, as a long-term program, a regional surveillance network 
that would provide information on maritime transportation systems.40
As one of its initiatives, IORA has established the Maritime Safety and Security 
Working Group to build capacities, enhance cross-border cooperation and knowl-
edge sharing, and promote harmonized implementation across the region of the 
relevant international regulations. The working group’s terms of reference recently 
have been finalized as a first step toward the completion of its work plan. It needs 
to aim at geostrategic cooperation, capacity building for maritime awareness, hu-
man safety at sea, capacity building for law enforcement at sea, and the like.
Enhanced capacity for IORA as well as this working group is the desideratum 
for the organization to be able to monitor closely all security-related develop-
ments, have adequate analytical backup to draw appropriate lessons from ongoing 
developments, and disseminate the results to and coordinate discussions among 
stakeholders. It also would require the support of a mechanism analogous to the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Such an agency 
would be ideal for developing norms on freedom of navigation and overflight, 
especially at the various choke points, which are vulnerable to interdiction arising 
out of political instability in littoral countries or regional conflicts between them.
This agency also could contribute to developing wider norms to be applied to 
IOR waterways and oceanic resources; the SAGAR construct provides examples. 
At the levels of both the president and the prime minister, Sri Lanka has sug-
gested a legal framework to address drug trafficking and other criminal activity 
while maintaining freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. 
The prime minister went so far as to suggest a “Code on the Freedom of Naviga-
tion” that must have an effective dispute-resolution mechanism.41
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. As an organization representing the chiefs of 
the littoral navies and other stakeholder, extraregional navies, IONS can provide 
professional inputs to IORA as the latter engages in the important task of enhanc-
ing maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean by developing the relevant 
norms. Through IONS’s own committees, interoperability procedures and capa-
bilities can be developed and habits of cooperation formalized. Maintaining this 
synergy between the two organizations is critical, given that the IONS member-
ship includes countries whose bilateral relations might be described as adver-
sarial. A communication channel also needs to be developed between IORA and 
IONS to function as an agenda interface, since maritime safety and security are 
matters of concern to both organizations.
Discussions can be encouraged within IONS on the subject of the ground rules 
for use of harbor facilities by extraregional navies sailing in the Indian Ocean. 
Alternatively, this theme can be discussed and developed within the relevant 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/7
 K U M A R  &  G H O S H  7 5
think-tank networks. A CSCAP-like think-tank network, with a looser hierarchy 
and process for agenda formulation, also could provide a platform for discussion 
of security-related developments, both traditional and nontraditional, regarding 
their implications for the overall IORA security milieu.
The outcome of all this effort should be a strategic framework for the Indian 
Ocean. The development of habits of cooperation would lead to an element of 
strategic trust. Eventually, such strategic trust would result in the kind of force 
equilibrium envisaged in the SAGAR construct, one that recognizes the legiti-
mate interests of all stakeholder countries but posits that the primary responsi-
bility for peace, stability, and prosperity rests with the littoral states themselves.
IORA’s Institutional Linkages. IORA is ideally suited to create capacities, consid-
ered within the littoral collectively, to put together a strategic framework for the 
Indian Ocean, as envisaged in the SAGAR speech. In that role, it could reach out 
to other subregional groups in the Indian Ocean that share a maritime element. 
A well-known expert on maritime geopolitics, invoking the concept of a regime 
complex for the IOR, has argued that IORA should play the role of a “systems in-
tegrator, facilitator, interlocutor, and even translator” for the Indian Ocean mari-
time system, in partnership with other subregional littoral organizations.42 Even 
as IORA is still developing its own ideas and capacities in the area of maritime 
safety and security, institutional linkages with the other subregional organiza-
tions discussed below would be beneficial.
• There is a maritime dimension to the activities of the GCC.43 However, for 
the foreseeable future any well-coordinated and cohesive institutional naval 
cooperation is unlikely because of serious divisions among the key members 
of the council.
• The two African organizations covering the continent’s Indian Ocean 
seaboard are the Southern African Development Community and the East 
African Community. These entities have ambitions to create a political/secu-
rity capability, with a maritime dimension; India and IORA could help them 
in this.44
• The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (known as BIMSTEC) is an organization that can provide a 
framework for a degree of maritime governance in the Bay of Bengal region, 
as most of the littoral countries are members.45
Some gaps in the existing maritime picture can be filled in by IORA through 
dialogue between, coordination among, and partnership with other organiza-
tions having something to do with the Indian Ocean in the wider Indo-Pacific 
construct. These include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
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the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, and 
the relevant UN bodies. To share best practices, IORA also can conduct periodic 
consultations with other regional groupings of littoral countries elsewhere, such 
as the Arctic Council.
India’s Naval Diplomacy and Thought Leadership
The Indian Navy is the second-most-powerful navy in the region and enjoys 
considerable convergence of strategic interests with the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy 
undergirds the current maritime order and is uniquely placed to seed and nurture 
the maritime system envisaged in the SAGAR construct.
Building such a system will require both bilateral and multilateral naval dip-
lomatic engagements. The Indian Navy and its affiliated think-tank participants 
can play a thought-leadership role. The diplomatic engagements involved need 
to be nuanced and light of touch; otherwise certain other elements—not all well-
disposed—may try to undermine the very diplomatic efforts attempting to create 
the envisaged maritime order. Certain recent developments, such as in Maldives, 
Seychelles, and elsewhere, suggest the need for a more nuanced Indian approach.
Naval Capacity Building
Multiple types of capability gaps in the existing maritime system—legislative, 
organizational, and operational—need to be closed. Judicious naval capacity 
building remains an important task. Accomplishing this is necessary to achieve 
a measure of stability by ensuring that the littoral navies themselves have the 
capacity to uphold the maritime system. These capacity-building efforts would 
need to involve and engage littoral navies, coast guards, coastal police forces, and 
any other maritime agencies active in the maintenance of good order at sea. Not 
only India but several other countries need to carry out this capacity building.
This effort would include building better capabilities to conduct maritime sur-
veillance, so as to help meet several of the challenges the maritime system faces. 
Implementation is ongoing pursuant to the Indian vice president’s announce-
ment on 7 March 2017 at the IORA summit in Jakarta regarding the setting up of 
an Information Fusion Centre. Such a center could help to coordinate on MDA 
and to institutionalize existing cooperative mechanisms and efforts, such as white 
shipping agreements and agreements related to hydrography.46 An important 
aspect of this capacity building would be to prepare state forces to neutralize the 
empowerment of nonstate actors by the so-called revolution in military affairs.
Closing the Capability Gaps, Including in Skills
Maritime Domain Awareness. MDA is the most relevant area of concern for the 
IOR. Better MDA can be achieved by combining the various facilities already 
existing in the region. This may entail capacity expansion for various entities to 
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enable them to fulfill multimission roles. This closing of domain-awareness gaps 
would involve not only building physical infrastructure but also developing the 
requisite protocols for information exchanges and finding a suitable platform on 
which to carry that out.
Think-Tank Capabilities. Musing over the current global geopolitical flux and 
the methodological conundrums that handicap analysis and scenario building, 
the authors of the U.S. National Intelligence Council report Global Trends 2030: 
Alternative Worlds spotlight numerous difficulties. Among others, they list the 
need for better identification of looming disequilibriums; better exploration of 
the relationship among trends, discontinuities, and crises; and correction of a 
tendency to underestimate the rate of change along trajectories of rise and decline 
for different states.47
Better think-tank capabilities would help to address the entire spectrum of 
issues listed above and to flesh out the concept of a pan–Indian Ocean maritime 
system. The think-tank infrastructure should include both transnational and 
internal (within India) networking. Capabilities should include scenario building 
in the current fluid Indian Ocean geopolitical context. This think-tank activity, 
both at the national and transnational network levels, would need to flesh out 
SAGAR’s normative framework. This activity should be coordinated so as to 
be consistent with SAGAR’s geopolitical construct, rather than proceeding in a 
segmented fashion.
The Indian Ocean maritime system is becoming increasingly fragile, and the U.S. 
Navy’s capacity to undergird it is diminishing perceptibly. Nonetheless, America 
retains significant national capabilities that can help shape a new maritime sys-
tem for the Indian Ocean, whereas China is not at present in a position to alter 
the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.
In contrast to those relating to other bodies of water in Southeast and East Asia 
within the Indo-Pacific construct, the Indian Ocean maritime system is fraying at 
the edges more than it is crumbling under intensifying great-power contestation. 
The Indian Ocean no longer serves as an instrument for naval force projection 
to achieve power equilibrium in the Middle Eastern hinterland, as was the case 
during the Cold War. A pan–Indian Ocean maritime system has to be devised 
to meet today’s context, in which the region faces multitudinous challenges to its 
political and economic stability.
The challenges in question are not only those that directly affect the littoral 
areas, with their huge populations and large proportions of global economic 
and resource wealth, but also those with effects felt much farther afield, in the 
hinterland. The stability of the Indian Ocean maritime system is critical to global 
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stability itself. The challenges inhere in the growing fragility of littoral states as 
well as the island nations. In addition, the rapidly accelerating naval rivalry in 
the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf negatively impacts any effort to create a 
stable Indian Ocean maritime system. Establishing a sturdy governance mecha-
nism would encourage the development of stakes on the part of regional as well 
as extraregional countries.
Given the rapid pace of events, the window of opportunity to build a holistic 
Indian Ocean maritime system may not remain open for long. The ramping up 
of maritime safety and security through capacity building, interoperability, and 
enhanced comfort levels, and thereby the successful addressing of nontraditional 
threats, remains the overriding priority. This effort is critical to maintaining 
regional stability, and therefore should receive support from all countries even 
as they retain their hard-power capabilities and options. Prime Minister Modi’s 
SAGAR perspective covers the entire spectrum of relevant challenges and offers 
Indian capabilities—in the form of both hard and soft power—to make a signal 
contribution to shaping such a maritime order.
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